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Abstract. Financial institutions may be vulnerable to predatory short selling. When
the stock of a nancial institution is shorted aggressively, leverage constraints imposed
by short-term creditors can force the institution to liquidate long-term investments at re
sale prices. For nancial institutions that are suciently close to their leverage constraints,
predatory short selling equilibria co-exist with no-liquidation equilibria (the vulnerability
region), or may even be the unique equilibrium outcome (the doomed region). Increased
coordination among short sellers expands the doomed region, where liquidation is the
unique equilibrium. Our model provides a potential justication for temporary restrictions
of short selling for vulnerable institutions and can be used to assess recent empirical
evidence on short-sale bans.
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PREDATORY SHORT SELLING 1
1. Introduction
The nancial crisis of 2007-09 and the recent European sovereign debt crisis have led to
a heated discussion on short selling nancial stocks. For example, as nancial stocks fell
sharply in the spring, summer, and fall of 2008, a number of banks, most notably Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Morgan Stanley, blamed short sellers for their woes.1 In
response, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and a number of international
nancial regulators took measures against short selling; most signicantly, some imposed
temporary restrictions on the short selling of nancial stocks, some even on short selling
in general. In August 2011, when European banks were struggling because of losses due to
the European sovereign debt crisis, market regulators in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium
imposed temporary bans on short selling for some nancial stocks.
On both occasions, the worry was that short selling was \predatory," in the sense that
short sellers were attempting to bring down fundamentally solvent nancial institutions by
triggering self-fullling downward spirals. However, this line of argument is at odds with
the consensus view in economics, which|broadly speaking|says that there is nothing
wrong with short selling. In fact, most economists would argue that short selling is a
valuable activity|short sellers help enforce the law of one price, facilitate price discovery,
and enhance liquidity. Moreover, short sale restrictions may lead to overvaluation and
bubbles, and reduce the ability of investors to hedge exposures.2 In the light of these
ndings, is there any economic justication to impose restrictions on short selling the
stock of nancial institutions?
In this paper, we present a model of predatory short selling. We show that, even though
short selling activity is benecial during \normal times," at times of stress short sellers
can, in fact, destabilize nancial institutions through predatory short sales. Predatory
short selling can occur in our model because nancial institutions are subject to leverage
constraints imposed by their short-term creditors and uninsured depositors. These lever-
age constraints capture a rst-order dierence between nancial institutions and regular
corporates: Relative to corporations that can match maturities of assets and liabilities, the
business model of a nancial institution almost necessarily involves maturity and liquidity
mismatch (see, e.g., Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krish-
namurthy (2013)), which exposes nancial institutions to sudden withdrawal of funding
in response declines in equity value. We show that, in the presence of such leverage con-
straints, predatory short sellers that temporarily depress the stock price of a nancial
1 See, for example, \Anatomy of the Morgan Stanley Panic,"Wall Street Journal, Novem-
ber 24, 2008.
2 For theoretical models on how short-sale constraints can lead to overvaluation, specu-
lative trading, and bubbles, see, for example, Miller (1977), Harrison and Kreps (1978),
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), and Hong and Stein (2003). Diamond and Verrecchia (1987)
show theoretically that a market with short-sale constraints incorporates information more
slowly than a market in which short sales are not restricted. Empirical evidence that short
sellers contribute to market eciency and market quality can be found, among others, in
Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001), Desai, Krishnamurthy, and Kumar (2006),
Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) , Chang, Cheng, and Yu (2007), Boehmer, Jones, and
Zhang (2008), Sa and Sigurdsson (2011), and Boehmer and Wu (2013). Short positions
are important hedging tools in a number of common trading strategies (e.g., hedging
options, convertible bonds, or market risk in long-short strategies).
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institution can force the nancial institution to sell long-term assets in order to repay
debt to satisfy their leverage constraint. When long-term assets have to be unwound at a
sucient discount, the resulting losses for the nancial institution allow predatory short
sellers to break even on their short positions.
Our model implies that nancial institutions can be vulnerable to attacks from preda-
tory short sellers when their balance sheets are weak. For nancial institutions that are
suciently close to their leverage constraints, predatory short selling equilibria co-exist
with no-liquidation equilibria (the vulnerability region), or may even be the unique equi-
librium outcome (the doomed region). In the vulnerability region there are two stable
equilibria. In one equilibrium, no predatory short selling occurs. In that case, the nancial
institution does not violate its constraint and can hold its long-term investments until
maturity. In the second equilibrium, however, predatory short selling causes the nancial
institution to violate its leverage constraint, leading to a complete liquidation of its long-
term asset holdings. In the doomed region, there is a unique stable equilibrium in which
predatory short sellers force the nancial institution to liquidate its entire long-term asset
holdings.
Comparing a regime with short selling to one with short-sale restrictions shows that,
during \normal times" when nancial institutions are well capitalized, the fundamental
value of the nancial institution cannot be aected by the presence of predatory short sell-
ers. In this region short sellers exclusively fulll their benecial roles of providing liquidity
and preventing overvaluation and bubbles that may distort real investment decisions|
conrming the consensus view that restricting short selling during normal times is likely
to have undesired consequences. However, this changes once a nancial institution enters
the vulnerability region or the doomed region. Here, short sellers can force inecient liqui-
dation of the nancial institutions' long-term assets, such that restrictions on short selling
can potentially be welfare-enhancing.
By highlighting the possibility of multiple equilibria, our model underlines the impor-
tant role of coordination in short selling attacks. Specically, adding a large short seller
(or, equivalently, a mass of small short sellers that can coordinate their actions) to our
competitive benchmark model expands the doomed region, where a predatory short selling
attack and full liquidation is the unique (and inecient) outcome. This contrasts sharply
with the situation where sellers are regular shareholders (rather than short sellers): In this
case, adding a large shareholder (or a mass of coordinated small shareholders) increases
the safety region, in which no liquidation is the unique equilibrium. Finally, we show that
when there is a large short seller and a potential large support buyer, the doomed region
depends on the relative strength (or ability to coordinate) of the large short seller and the
support buyer.
Overall, our results provide a potential justication for temporary short sale restrictions
for nancial institutions at times when their balance sheets are weak. These restrictions
should be temporary and targeted specically at weak nancial institutions because well-
capitalized nancial institutions are not susceptible to predatory short selling attacks, such
that the only eect of a ban on short selling for those institutions would be a reduction
in liquidity and market quality of their stock. Moreover, because our results are driven by
a constraint on market leverage that is imposed by short-term creditors, it highlights the
particular vulnerability of nancial institutions|because of the maturity mismatch and
liquidity mismatch inherent in their business models, nancial institutions are subject to
nancial fragility in the form of creditor runs, which makes them vulnerable to predatory
short sellers. Our model is less likely to apply to rms with more stable capital structures.
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Finally, our analysis has implications on the disclosure of short positions. By facilitating
coordination among short sellers, full and timely disclosure of short positions may in fact
make it easier for short sellers to prey on vulnerable nancial institutions.
The empirical evidence on the recent short-sale bans in the U.S. and Europe unambigu-
ously documents reductions in market liquidity and market quality as a result of short
sale bans. However, there is no strong empirical support for positive price eects of recent
short sale bans, perhaps the main motivation of these bans. Using daily international data
on recent short-sale bans around the world, Beber and Pagano (2013) document that the
short-sale bans implemented during the nancial crisis of 2007-2009 led to reductions in
market liquidity and slower price discovery. They also document that short-sale constraints
failed to support stock prices, except potentially those of large U.S. nancial stocks. In
similar spirit, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013), using intraday data on the 2008 short-
sale ban in the U.S., document a deterioration of liquidity and market quality in response
to the short-sale ban. Yet, their analysis also nds little evidence that short-sale bans sup-
ported prices: Only the largest nancial institutions had (permanent) positive abnormal
returns during 2008 short-sale ban, and Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) point out that
the price eects of the short selling ban are hard to disentangle from the eects of the
contemporaneous Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).3
Our results may help interpret the existing empirical ndings on the eect of short
selling bans, and may also be useful in the empirical design of future studies. First, when
looking at price eects, our model suggests that nancial institutions, rather than regular
rms, should be particularly aected by short sale bans. Second, in our model, the ability of
short sellers to prey on nancial institutions depends crucially on the nancial condition of
the nancial institution. Hence, a second cross-sectional prediction of our model is that in
assessing the price eects of short-sale restrictions, one should control for leverage, liquidity
mismatch, or similar variables that measure nancial fragility. The prediction of our model
is that it is vulnerable nancial rms for which the price eects of short sale bans are likely
largest. Third, our model highlights the importance of taking into account the potential
multiplicity of equilibria when interpreting the empirical evidence. For example, if investors
expect that, with some probability, there is a switch to the dominated equilibrium in
which the bank goes bankrupt, the elimination of the bad equilibrium through temporary
short selling bans when nancial institutions enter the vulnerability region may lead to
permanent positive price eects. In addition to the cross-sectional predictions above, a
3 A number of other studies have investigated the eects of recent short-sale bans. For
example, Marsh and Payne (2012) document a decrease in market quality in UK equity
markets in response to the 2008 short selling ban. Using U.S. and European data, Lioui
(2011) documents an increase in volatility in response to the 2008 short selling ban, but no
eect on the price skewness. Autore, Billingsley, and Kovacs (2011) document that during
the 2008 short sale ban in the U.S., stocks with a larger decline in liquidity also have
poorer contemporaneous returns, consistent with the model of Amihud and Mendelson
(1986). Harris, Namvar, and Phillips (2013) use a factor model to document price ination
in banned stocks as a result of the 2008 short selling ban in the U.S., particularly for
rms without traded options. Their results suggest that price eects were temporary for
stocks with negative pre-ban performance and permanent for rms with positive pre-ban
performance. Kolasinski, Reed, and Thornock (2013) document that variations in short
interest had larger price eect during the shorting ban, consistent with an increase in the
informativeness of short sales in response to increased short sale restrictions.
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novel prediction of our model is that the vulnerability of a nancial institution to predatory
short selling depends not only on its own balance sheet but also on the balance sheets (or
funding conditions) of its large shareholders.
At a theoretical level, the potential justication for restrictions on short selling provided
by our model is similar to that given in the literature on feedback eects from stock
prices to rms' real decisions.4 For example, Goldstein and Gumbel (2008) provide an
asymmetric information model, in which a feedback loop to real investment decisions
allows a short seller to make a prot even in the absence of fundamental information.
Khanna and Mathews (2012) study the interaction between an uninformed speculator and
an informed blockholder to a rm. They show that, under certain conditions, manipulation
by an uninformed speculator is possible even in the presence of an informed blockholder,
whose incentives are aligned with value maximization. A major dierence between these
papers and our analysis is the channel through which short selling can be protable. In
both Goldstein and Gumbel (2008) and Khanna and Mathews (2012), short sellers reduce
price informativeness, thereby inducing the rm (whose manager learns from prices) to
ineciently distort its (future) investments, which makes the short position protable. In
our framework, price declines brought about by short sellers can trigger inecient early
liquidation of existing investments via the leverage constraint. In our view, this latter
channel is particularly relevant for the recent discussion on short-sale bans, which has
centered around nancial institutions.A related feedback mechanism arises in Goldstein,
Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013). In their model, a provider of equity capital learns from the
rm's stock price and provides less capital to the rm when he infers negative information
from the rm's stock price.5
In terms of the focus on nancial institutions, the paper closest to ours is Liu (2011). Liu
develops a two-stage global games model: In the rst stage, short sellers take positions. In
the second stage, creditors decide whether or not to roll over their debt. As in Goldstein and
Gumbel (2008), the presence of short sellers reduces price informativeness. The resulting
increase in uncertainty about fundamentals reduces the value of short-term debt claims
(due to their concave payo) and can induce creditors to run in the second stage. Hence,
a major dierence to our paper is how short-sale attacks work: In our framework it is the
reduction in the market value of equity that makes a short selling attack possible. In Liu
(2011), it is the increase in price uncertainty (and not the price reduction) that leads to
a creditor run. Liu's framework leads to policy prescriptions that are broadly in line with
ours. First, as in our model, his framework implies that banks with weak fundamentals
are prone to short-sale attacks. Second, Liu argues that more maturity mismatch makes
short-selling attacks more likely. This is consistent with our model, where one can interpret
the severity of the leverage constraint as a proxy for maturity mismatch (the more short
term creditors the bank has, the more binding the run constraint).6
4 For a comprehensive survey of this literature, see Bond, Edmans, and Golstein (2012).
5 Khanna and Sonti (2004) and Ozdenoren and Yuan (2008) provide models with exoge-
nous feedback from nancial markets to real outcomes.
6 More broadly, our paper also relates to the literature on market manipulation, and
predatory trading. Allen and Gale (1992) provide a model in which a non-informed
trader can make a prot if investors think the manipulator may be an informed trader.
Other papers that consider manipulative trading strategies include Allen and Gorton
(1992), Benabou and Laroque (1992), Kumar and Seppi (1992), Gerard and Nanda (1993),
Chakraborty and Yilmaz (2004), and Brunnermeier (2005). Brunnermeier and Pedersen
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2. gives a brief summary
of regulatory response to short selling during the nancial crises of 2007-2009 and the
European sovereign debt crisis of 2011. Section 3. presents the model. Section 4. pro-
vides a discussion of the model's policy implications and empirical predictions. Section 5.
concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2. Recent regulatory response to short selling
As a result of the nancial market turmoil in 2008, the SEC and a number of international
nancial market regulators put in eect a number of new rules regarding short selling. In
July the SEC issued an emergency order banning so-called \naked" short selling7 in the
securities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and primary dealers at commercial and investment
banks. In total 18 stocks were included in the ban, which took eect on Monday July 21
and was in eect until August 12.
On September 19 2008, the SEC banned all short selling of stocks of nancial companies.
This much broader ban initially included a total of 799 rms, and more rms were added
to this list over time. In a statement regarding the ban, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox
said, \The Commission is committed to using every weapon in its arsenal to combat
market manipulation that threatens investors and capital markets. The emergency order
temporarily banning short selling of nancial stocks will restore equilibrium to markets.
This action, which would not be necessary in a well-functioning market, is temporary in
nature and part of the comprehensive set of steps being taken by the Federal Reserve, the
Treasury, and the Congress." This broad ban of all short selling in nancial institutions
was initially set to expire on October 2, but was extended until Wednesday October 9,
i.e., three days after the emergency legislation (the bailout package) was passed.
In addition to measures taken by the SEC, a number of international nancial regulators
also acted in response to short selling. On September 21 2008, Australia temporarily
banned all forms of short selling, with only market makers in options markets allowed to
take covered short positions to hedge. In Great Britain, the Financial Services Authority
(FSA) enacted a moratorium on short selling of 29 nancial institutions from September
18 2008 until January 16 2009. Also Germany, Ireland, Switzerland and Canada banned
short selling of some nancial stocks, while France, the Netherlands and Belgium banned
naked short selling of nancial companies.
International restrictions on short selling of nancial stocks reappeared in 2011. In
August of 2011, market regulators in France, Spain, Italy and Belgium imposed temporary
restrictions on the short selling of certain nancial stocks as European banks came under
increasing pressure as part of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. For example, both Spain
and Italy imposed a temporary bans on new short positions, or increases in existing short
positions, for a number of nancial shares. France temporarily restricted short selling for
11 companies, including Axa, BNP Paribas and Credit Agricole.8 On August 26, France,
(2005) provide a model in which a predatory trader can exploit another trader's need to
liquidate.
7 In a naked short-sale transaction, the short seller does not borrow the share before
entering the short position.
8 See Howard Mustoe and Jesse Westbrook, \Short Selling of Stocks Banned in France,
Spain," Bloomberg, August 12, 2011.
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Italy and Spain extended their temporary bans on short selling until at least the end of
September.
Of course, measures against short selling are not exclusive to these recent episodes. In
response to the market crash of 1929, the SEC enacted the uptick rule, which restricts
traders from selling short on a downtick. In 1940, legislation was passed that banned
mutual funds from short selling. Both of these restriction were in eect until 2007. Going
back even further in time, the UK banned short selling in the 1630s in response to the
Dutch tulip mania.
3. Model
We consider a simple model with three periods, t = 0; 1; 2. At t = 0, a nancial institution
has invested in X units of a long-term asset. The nancial institution has also taken out
demandable debt with face value D0. We take both the initial position in the risky asset
as well as the initial debt outstanding as given.
Most of our analysis focuses on the interim date t = 1. Seen from t = 1, the long-
term asset is expected to pay o a deterministic amount R at t = 2. If needed, the long-
term asset can be liquidated at t = 1, but early liquidation is subject to a discount; the
liquidation value at t = 1 is given by R, where  < 1. Hence, early liquidation is inecient.
For simplicity, we assume that the nancial institution holds no cash, but the model could
be straightforwardly extended to allow for cash holdings.
Leverage Constraint. Key to our analysis is that the nancial institution is subject
to a leverage constraint. Specically, we assume that debt as a fraction of debt plus the




This leverage constraint captures in a simple way a fundamental dierence between
nancial institutions and regular corporations. Specically, relative to corporations that
can match maturities of assets and liabilities, the business model of a nancial institu-
tion almost necessarily involves maturity and liquidity mismatch (see, e.g., Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Brunnermeier, Gorton, and Krishnamurthy (2013)). Moreover, beyond
the maturity mismatch that is inherent in their business model, nancial institutions may
have an additional incentive to take on signicant maturity mismatch because of collective
moral hazard (Farhi and Tirole (2012)) or because their inability to commit to longer-term
nancing leads to a maturity rat race (Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2013)).
In the presence of maturity mismatch, the leverage constraint (1) emerges because unin-
sured depositors and creditors of the bank withdraw their funding when the bank's market
leverage exceeds  at the interim date. While we do not model this formally, what we have
in mind is that creditors use the market price of equity to update their expectations on
the bank's prospects and refuse to roll over their loans whenever the nancial institution's
market leverage exceeds a threshold . One can thus think of the leverage constraint as
a \run constraint," in the sense that creditors run on the bank following negative sig-
nals about the value of the bank's equity relative to its outstanding debt obligations (as
in models of fundamental bank runs, such as Postlewaite and Vives (1987), Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988), or Goldstein and Pauzner (2005)). This interpretation of the lever-
age constraint also highlights the connection to the literature on feedback eects of asset
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prices|the constraint captures, in reduced form, the feedback that arises when providers
of capital learn from prices (as, for example, in Goldstein, Ozdenoren, and Yuan (2013)).
We formulate the leverage constraint in terms of market leverage. However, what ulti-
mately is important for the model is that|independent of its particular form|the leverage
constraint implies that when the nancial institution's market value of equity falls below
a certain value, the nancial institution is forced to liquidate some of its long-term assets
in order to repay creditors. As we will show below, in certain circumstances this feedback
mechanism, triggered by stock price declines, can make the nancial institution vulnerable
to short sellers in the equity market.9
Equity Market. At date t = 1, the equity of the nancial institution is traded in a
nancial market. This nancial market is populated by two types of investors, a compet-
itive fringe of passive long-term investors and active traders which act as short sellers.
More generally, one could think of the short sellers as arbitrageurs that can take both
long or short positions. However, since the main results of our paper revolve around the
eects of short selling, we will refer to them as short sellers. We also assume that short
sellers start with a zero position in the nancial institution's equity. We discuss the case
of regular sellers and dierences between selling and short selling in Section 3.3.
The long-term investors are competitive and oer demand schedules to the short sellers.
The long-term investors are thus not active traders themselves, they simply form a residual
demand curve that short sellers can sell into. Upon observing the demand schedules oered
by the long-term investors, short sellers decide whether to take a position in the stock.
Short sellers are competitive and thus make zero prots in equilibrium.
We focus on the interaction in the equity market at the intermediate period, t = 1.
At t = 1, the two types of players, long-term investors and short sellers, interact in the
following way. Long-term investors choose the slope and intercept of a demand schedule
that they oer to the short sellers. We denote the intercept by P and the slope by .
Formally the long-term investors' action space is thus given by the pair (P ; ) 2 R R+.
Note that by assumption  > 0, i.e., the residual demand curve for the stock is downward
sloping. However, as we will argue below, the slope of the demand curve can be arbitrarily
small.10 Upon observing the demand schedules oered to them, the short sellers decide
how much of the stock they want to sell short. Their action space is thus the size of
their short position, S 2 R.11 Given these ingredients, we can write price of the nancial
institution's equity at t = 1 as eP = P   S: (2)
9 This particular vulnerability of nancial institution's is echoed in the SEC's justication
of the 2008 short selling ban, which highlights the potential loss of condence of trading
counterparties in response to short selling.
10 There are a number of ways to justify a downward-sloping demand curve. For example,
our assumption may capture in reduced form that long-term investors are risk averse and
need to be compensated for risk that hey hold in equilibrium. The downward sloping
demand curve may also the be the result of information asymmetries (as in Kyle (1985))
that are not modeled explicitly here.
11 While we focus on short positions, we do not rule out long positions, which can be
taken by picking a negative S. Hence, short sellers in this model are not short sellers
by assumption|rather, they take short positions to exploit the nancial institution's
constraint, which is not possible by taking long positions.
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Equilibrium. The equilibrium amount of short selling will be determined by a zero
prot condition, meaning that the stock price at t = 1, eP = P   S must be a rational
prediction of the value of equity at t = 2, when the long-term investment pays o and
equity investors receive their payo. Denoting the payo to equity holders at date t = 2
by P , the equilibrium condition is thus given byeP = P: (3)
Predatory Short Selling. We distinguish two types of short selling. In an equilibrium
with regular short selling, short sellers are active, but their only eect is to ensure that the
stock price coincides with the given fundamental value of the nancial institution's equity.
In other words, regular short selling ensures that the price is right, but does not aect the
fundamental value of the rm. In an equilibrium with predatory short selling, on the other
hand, the act of short selling reduces the fundamental value of the nancial institution|it
forces early liquidation of long-term assets at a loss. Through this feedback mechanism,
predatory short selling reduces the value of equity and thus becomes self fullling. Hence,
while regular short selling ensures that prices are right for a given fundamental and is thus
benecial, predatory short selling destroys fundamental value and is inecient.
Note that, in our formulation, long-term investors act essentially as passive shareholders.
Specically, we rule out that current shareholders can meet the leverage constraint by
recapitalizing the bank. This assumption reects that recapitalization via issuing new
equity may be hard in the midst of a short selling attack (in addition to the more general
observation that issuing equity may be costly because of the usual asymmetric information
considerations). Similarly, we rule out that the nancial institution renegotiates its debt,
for example through a debt for equity swap. This assumption seems reasonable given
that a nancial institution that faces dispersed short-term creditors (or depositors) will
usually have a hard time renegotiating debt, because of the coordination issues inherent
in renegotiating dispersed debt issues.12
3.1 BENCHMARK CASE WITHOUT LEVERAGE CONSTRAINT
We rst solve a benchmark model without the leverage constraint. As we will see, in
this setup short sellers serve a role in ensuring that the nancial institution's equity is
fairly priced (through regular short selling), but the short sellers' actions do not have any
inuence on the fundamental value of the nancial institution. Hence, in the absence of
the leverage constraint, predatory short selling cannot occur in equilibrium.
Lemma 1. When nancial institutions are not subject to the leverage constraint (1),
predatory short selling does not occur in equilibrium.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is simple. Because absent the leverage constraint the
fundamental payo to equity holders is xed at XR D0, only regular short selling can
occur in equilibrium: short sellers may take a short position to ensure that the nancial
12 Potentially, the coordination problems in renegotiating debt could be mitigated if the
nancial institution issued some amount reverse convertible debt that can be converted
into equity when the leverage constraint is binding. However, recall that in the Diamond
and Rajan (2001) model of banking, it is precisely the inability to renegotiate debt that
makes nancing with dispersed short-term ecient for nancial institutions.
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institution's equity is valued correctly in cases where the long-term investors pick an
intercept that exceeds fundamental value, i.e., P > XR D0: However, there is no way
for short sellers to aect the fundamental value of the nancial institution's equity, which
makes predatory short selling impossible.
Lemma 1 thus highlights the benecial role of regular short selling. When equity is over-
priced relative to fundamental value, the ability to take short positions allows short sellers
(or, more generally, arbitrageurs) to correct such overvaluation and make sure that equity
is fairly priced. This is benecial because overvaluation may lead to distorted investment
incentives and, ultimately, misallocation of resources. This benecial role of regular short
selling is the main reason why unconditional short selling bans are undesirable.
For the remainder of the paper, we will focus on predatory short selling and put aside
the benecial role of short selling illustrated in Lemma 1. To do this, we focus on the
case, in which the intercept chosen by long-term investors reects the fundamental value
of equity in the absence of short selling. For example, if in the absence of short selling the
nancial institution does not have to sell any assets at the interim date, the long-term
investors pick P = XR D0. Focusing on the case implies that there is no role for regular
short sellers, since in the absence of leverage constraints short sellers would never take a
position. This assumption thus allows us to restrict our analysis to predatory short selling.
However, as we discuss below, focusing on the case in which long-term investors set the
intercept P equal to the fundamental value of equity in the absence of short selling is
essentially without loss of generality: With slight adjustments the analysis generalizes to
arbitrary P . The main dierence between the two cases is that when P can deviate from
fundamental value, short sellers may also serve a benecial role by reducing overpricing.
3.2 INTRODUCING THE LEVERAGE CONSTRAINT
We now introduce leverage constraint. Recall that the leverage constraint (1) requires
the nancial institution to keep leverage (dened as debt divided by debt plus the market
value of equity) below a critical level : D
D+E
 . When the leverage constraint is violated
at date t = 1, the nancial institution must repay some of its debt to reduce leverage and
thus has to liquidate some of the long-term asset holdings.
Denote the number of units of the long-term asset the nancial institution has to sell
at t = 1 by X(S), where S is the position taken by short sellers. If at t = 1 the nancial
institution sells X(S) units of the long-term asset to repay debt, this leads to an equity
payout at time t = 2 of
P = max [XR D0   (1  )RX(S); 0] (4)
The reduction in equity value, (1  )RX(S), reects the fact that the long-term asset
can only be sold at a discount. Using equation (4), we can thus rewrite the equilibrium
condition (3) as
P   S = max [XR D0   (1  )RX(S); 0] : (5)
How much does the nancial institution have to liquidate? In order to nd
potential equilibria, we need to determine how much the nancial institution needs to
liquidate at t = 1. First note that when, given a short position of S, the leverage constraint
is not violated, the nancial institution does not have to liquidate any of its long-term
investments. In this case X(S) = 0. On the other hand, when the equity value at t = 1
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(including the price eects of the short position S) is such that the constraint is violated,
D0
D0 + P   S
> ; (6)
the nancial institution has to sell X(S) units of the long-term asset and repay debt
in order to satisfy the constraint. The amount the nancial institution has to liquidate is
then determined by the following condition:
D0  X(S)R
D0  X(S)R+ P   S
= : (7)
The numerator in (7) is the amount of debt remaining after liquidating X(S) units
of the long-term investment and thereby reducing outstanding debt by X(S)R. The
denominator contains remaining debt D0  X(S)R plus the market value of equity
P   S. Solving (7) for X(S) yields the following result:
Lemma 2. The amount of the long-term asset that the nancial institution needs to
liquidate under the leverage constraint (1) and in the presence of short sellers that take an















Figure 1 illustrates what happens once we introduce the leverage constraint. In the
illustration, absent short sales the leverage constraint is satised. However, a suciently
large position by short sellers can force the nancial institution to liquidate some of its
long-term asset holdings. These forced sales reduce the nancial institution's equity value
equity because the long-term asset has to be sold at a discount to fundamental value
(when sold at t = 1 it yields R rather than R). Hence, the fundamental value of the
nancial institution's equity has a kink at the point where the leverage constraint becomes
binding and forces the nancial institution to sell assets. To facilitate comparison to the
benchmark case discussed above, the dashed line indicates the fundamental value of equity
in the absence of the leverage constraint.
Recall the equilibrium condition, eP = P . This condition implies that potential equilibria
are intersections of the two lines in Figure 1, i.e., points where the price in the equity
market at t = 1 rationally reects the fundamental value of the equity of the nancial
institution at t = 2. Turn rst to the top panel of Figure 1. We continue to assume that
long-term investors choose the intercept P to be equal to fundamental value absent short
sales, i.e., P = XR D0.13 Because the two lines only intersect once, the only equilibrium
remains the one without short selling|even though the short sellers can drive down the
fundamental value of the nancial institution by forcing it to liquidate some of its long-
term investments, they invariably lose money in the process. This is the case whenever the
liquidation value of the long-term asset, which is parameterized by , is suciently large.
13 As we show below, this assumption is not crucial in the sense that the equilibria are
independent of the particular choice of P and . We focus on the case P = XR D0
because it allows us to focus exclusively on predatory short selling. The main dierence
to the case P 6= XR D0 is that now also the benecial role of short selling (as discussed
above) emerges.
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In this case, the value destruction on response to a violation of the leverage constrained
is small, such that predatory short selling is not protable. The unique equilibrium is the
one where P = XR D0. When P = XR D0 this implies that the equilibrium amount
of short selling is S = 0. More generally, when P 6= XR D0, short selling can occur
in equilibrium, but only in its benecial role of ensuring that prices are equal to the
fundamental XR D0.
The bottom panel of Figure 1, on the other hand, shows that when  is suciently
small, predatory short selling can emerge. In this case, in addition to the equilibrium
without short selling, two further equilibria emerge. Both of these additional equilibria
involve predatory short selling: Short sellers cause a decrease in the nancial institution's
equity value at t = 1, which forces the nancial institution to liquidate long-term asset
holdings to an extent that allows short sellers to break even. As is usually the case, the
middle equilibrium is unstable (such that a small perturbation would lead to migration to
either of the two stable equilibria).
Equilibrium prices are independent of  and P . One convenient feature of our
model is that, as long as short sellers are not restricted in the number of shares they can
short, the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium amount of the long-term asset that the
nancial institution needs to liquidate are independent of the particular P and  chosen
by the long-term investors. Hence, while there are many equilibria involving dierent
combinations of P ,  and S, these equilibria are isomorphic in terms of equilibrium prices
and liquidation quantities. One implication of this feature of the model is that while
setting the intercept P equal to fundamental value absent short selling allows us to focus
exclusively on predatory short selling, equilibrium prices and the existence of predatory
short selling equilibria do not depend on this assumption.
Lemma 3. When short sellers are unconstrained in the size of the short position they
take, the equilibrium prices and the amount that has to be liquidated by the nancial
institution is independent of  and P .
This independence result is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case in which the leverage
constraint is satised absent short selling. The top panel shows that when  is decreased
from 0.75 (dashed line) to 0.6 (solid line), the equilibrium amount of short selling changes,
but equilibrium prices remain the same. The bottom panel shows that when, in addition,
also the intercept P is increased from 32 to 34, the equilibrium prices again remain un-
changed. In this case, the equilibrium in which P = RX  D0 exhibits benecial short
selling, while the other two equilibria exhibit predatory short selling.
Lemma 3 is convenient since it allows us to classify equilibria by looking only at equi-
librium prices and the amount of the long-term asset that has to be liquidated by the
nancial institution.
Overview of Equilibria.We are now in a position to summarize the equilibria in the
equity market at t = 1. In the proposition, we focus on the case where the long-term asset
is relatively illiquid,  < . This is the case depicted in the right panel of Figure 1. The
(less interesting) case    is discussed in the appendix.
Proposition 1. In the presence of the leverage constraint (1), when  <  we distinguish
three regions.
12 M. K. BRUNNERMEIER AND M. OEHMKE


























Fig. 1. Introducing the leverage constraint. When the leverage constraint is
introduced (in this gure,  = 0:7), a suciently large short position can force the
nancial institution to liquidate some of its long-term asset holdings. In the top
panel, the loss to the nancial institution from liquidating the long asset is not
large enough to make a predatory short position protable ( = 0:75). The only
equilibrium is the one in which no predatory short selling occurs. In the bottom
panel, on the other hand, we see that when the losses from liquidating the long-term
asset are large enough, two predatory short selling equilibria emerge in addition to
the equilibrium without predatory short selling ( = 0:6). The middle equilibrium is
unstable. The remaining parameters in this gure are: X = 10; R = 10;D = 68;  =
0:75
1. Safety region: When the nancial institution is suciently well capitalized, R >
D0
X
, there is a unique equilibrium in which the nancial institution does not have
to liquidate any of its long-term holdings. No predatory short selling can occur,
X(S) = 0, and P = XR D0.
2. Vulnerability region: When D0
X
 R  D0
X
, there are two stable equilibria and
one unstable equilibrium.
a. In one stable equilibrium, the nancial institution does not liquidate any of its
long-term holdings, X(S) = 0, and P = XR D0.
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Fig. 2. Equilibrium prices are independent of P and . The top panel
shows that when  is decreased from 0.75 (dashed line) to 0.6 (solid line), the
equilibrium amount of short selling changes, but equilibrium prices remain the
same. The bottom panel shows that when in addition also the intercept P is in-
creased from 32 to 34, the equilibrium prices again remain unchanged. In this case,
the equilibrium in which P = RX  D0 exhibits benecial short selling, while the
other two equilibria exhibit predatory short selling. The remaining parameters are
R = 10;X = 10;  = 0:6;  = 0:7;D = 68.
b. In the other stable equilibrium, the nancial institution is forced to liquidate its
entire holdings of the long-term asset, i.e., X(S) = X and P = 0.
c. In the unstable equilibrium, the nancial institution has to liquidate part of its
equity holdings, X(S) = X
  D0
XR
  and P =
1 
  (D0   XR)
3. Doomed region: When R < D0
X
, there is a unique stable equilibrium and an un-
stable equilibrium.
a. In the stable equilibrium, short sellers are active and the nancial institution
liquidates its entire holdings of the long-term asset, X(S) = X and P = 0.
b. In the region D0
X
> R > D0
X(1+)
an unstable equilibrium exists, in which
short sellers are not active and the nancial institution liquidates part
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 (1 ) and P = XR D0  
1 
 (1 ) [D0   XR].
Figure 3 illustrates the equilibria as a function of XR, the fundamental value of the
nancial institution's long-term asset holdings. As Proposition 1 points out, there are
three regions of interest. First, when R is suciently high, short sellers cannot protably
force the nancial institution to liquidate long-term asset holdings. In this region, the
nancially institution is suciently well-capitalized, such that the only equilibrium is the
one in which the nancial institution holds its long-term investments until maturity. We
refer to this region as the safety region. In the safety region, short sellers solely fulll
the benecial function of correcting the equity value of the nancial institution when the
long-term investors oer an intercept higher than the fundamental value of equity. One
important implication from this region is that, when nancial institutions are healthy one
should not be concerned about predatory behavior by short sellers. Hence, our framework
does not lend support to unconditional short selling bans.
However, when R drops suciently, there is a second region with multiple equilibria. In
this region, the leverage constraint is satised if short sellers do not take predatory short
positions. Hence, there still is an equilibrium without short selling and without liquida-
tion by the nancial institution. However, there are now also two equilibria in which short
sellers take predatory short positions and force the nancial institution to liquidate some
or all of its long-term asset holdings. In this region, the nancial institution is vulnerable
to predatory short selling, even though absent short selling the leverage constraint is not
binding. We thus refer to this region of multiple equilibria as the vulnerability region. This
vulnerability region emerges only when  < , i.e., when the long-term asset held by the
nancial institution is suciently illiquid. This highlights the importance of liquidity mis-
match (illiquid long-term assets nanced with short-term credit) in facilitating predatory
short selling.
Finally, there is a third region with two equilibria, on stable and one unstable. In the
stable equilibrium, short sellers are active and force the nancial institution to liquidate
its entire asset holdings, such that the equity value of the nancial institution is given by
P = 0. In the unstable equilibrium, short sellers are not active and the nancial institution
liquidates part of its long-term asset holdings. Because in this region the unique stable
equilibrium involves a complete liquidation of the nancial institution, we refer to this
region as the doomed region.
The eect of banning short selling.We are now in a position to compare outcomes
under a regime in which short selling is allowed and a regime in which short selling is
prohibited. When short selling is restricted, the nancial institution only needs to liqui-
date at date t = 1 when the leverage constraint is violated absent predatory short sellers.
Proposition 2 compares the two regimes, focusing on stable equilibria.
Proposition 2. Consider again the case  < . The eect of banning short selling on
equilibrium prices and the quantity of the long-term investment liquidated by the nancial
institution depends on the equilibrium region:
1. Safety region: When the nancial institution is suciently well capitalized (R >
D0
X
), equilibrium prices and the amount the nancial institution needs to liquidate
coincide. In both cases, the unique equilibrium is P = XR D0 and X = 0.
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Fig. 3. Overview of Equilibria. This plot shows the equilibrium equity value
of the nancial institution as a function of R. For high values of R, there is a
unique equilibrium without predatory short selling (safety region). Once R drops
suciently low, there is a region with multiple equilibria (when  > ). In this
vulnerability region predatory short selling can emerge. The middle equilibrium is
unstable. When R is so low that the leverage constraint binds in the absence of short
selling, there is a stable equilibrium with predatory short selling and an unstable
equilibrium without predatory short selling (the doomed region). The parameter
values in this graph are X = 10;  = 0:6;  = 0:7;D = 68.
2. Vulnerability region: In the vulnerability region (D0
X
 R  D0
X
), when short sell-
ing is restricted no liquidation takes place and the unique equilibrium is given by
P = XR D0 and X = 0. When short sellers are present, on the other hand,
there is a second stable equilibrium, in which predatory short sellers force the -
nancial institution to liquidate its entire long-term asset holdings: X = X and
P = 0.
3. Doomed region: In the doomed region (R < D0
X
), when short selling is re-
stricted the nancial institution liquidates part of its long-term asset holdings as
long as R > D0
X(1+)




 (1 ) and P = XR D0  
1 
 (1 ) [D0   XR]. When R  D0X(1+) , the nancial institution liquidates its
entire long-term asset holdings even when short selling is restricted, and P = 0.
When short sellers are present, in the doomed region the nancial institution al-
ways liquidates its entire holdings and P = 0.
Figure 4 illustrates the main dierences between a regime with short selling (solid line)
and a regime in which short selling is restricted (dashed line). First, note that when short
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Fig. 4. The eect of banning short selling. This gure compares equilibria
with and without short selling, focusing on stable equilibria. When short selling
is allowed (solid line), there are multiple equilibria once the nancial institution
enters the vulnerability region. In one of the two stable equilibria, predatory short
sellers force the nancial institution to liquidate its entire long-term asset holdings.
In the doomed region, in the unique stable equilibrium short sellers always force
the nancial institution to unwind its entire asset holdings. When short selling is
not allowed (dashed line), the nancial institution does not have to liquidate in
the vulnerability region and P = XR D0. Moreover, in the doomed region, the
nancial institution only has to liquidate part of its long-term asset holdings when
short selling is restricted (except when R is so low that the nancial institution has
to liquidate everything even in the absence of short selling). The parameter values
in this example are X = 10;  = 0:6;  = 0:7;D = 68.
sales are restricted, there is no vulnerability region|the nancial institution only has
to liquidate some of its long-term asset holdings if the leverage constraint is violated in
the absence of temporary price movements caused by short sellers. When short selling
is allowed, on the other hand, the vulnerability region emerges and there is a second
equilibrium in which short sellers prey on the nancial institution, forcing it to unwind its
entire long-term asset holdings. Hence, in this region predatory short sellers can force a
collapse of the nancial institution, even though the nancial institution would be sound
in the absence of short selling.
Second, when the leverage constraint is violated even in the absence of short selling, the
amount the nancial institution has to liquidate is (weakly) smaller when short selling is
restricted. This is the case because in the doomed region in the unique stable equilibrium
short sellers force the nancial institution to liquidate its entire portfolio. When no short
sellers are present, on the other hand, the nancial institution can in general satisfy the
leverage constraint by selling only part of its long-term asset holdings, except when R
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drops so low that the nancial institution enters a \death spiral" (i.e, it has to liquidate
all long-term asset holdings even when no short sellers are present). In the gure, this
happens at the point where the dashed line meets the x-axis.
Of course, one caveat of the analysis above is that we have focused exclusively on the
case in which, absent short selling, the equity of the nancial institution is priced correctly.
This allowed us to focus exclusively on characterizing the conditions under which predatory
short selling can occur. More generally, the potential welfare costs of predatory short
selling have to be weighed against the benecial eects of regular short selling through
the elimination of overvaluation and improvements in market quality and liquidity. As
discussed above, in the safety region predatory short selling cannot occur and the only
eect of short sellers is the elimination of mispricing. Clearly, in this region, a short-sale
ban is not desirable. In the vulnerability region, on the other hand, the costs of potential
predatory short selling have to be weighed against the potential benets from regular short
selling. The desirability of a potential short selling ban then depends on the relative size
of these two eects. While formally our model does not deliver predictions on how large
these two eects may be in practice, it does provide some informal guidance. For example,
if one believes that a nancial institution is only temporarily in the vulnerability region,
a short selling ban may prevent the collapse of the nancial institution, while the costs of
temporary overvaluation of the nancial institution's equity might be moderate. Similarly,
in the doomed region one would have to weigh the benets of controlled deleveraging that
is possible in the absence of short sellers against the potential costs of overvaluation in
this region.
3.3 REGULAR SELLING VERSUS SHORT SELLING
Up to now our analysis has focused exclusively on short selling. In this section, we contrast
our results to those that would obtain if we replaced short sellers with regular sellers
(i.e., investors who have an initial endowment of shares in the nancial institution). This
will sharpen the distinction between regular selling and short selling and highlight the
important role important role of coordination.
The distinction between short selling and regular selling is particularly relevant in the
vulnerability region where, as shown above, multiple equilibria Pareto-ranked equilibria
are possible: In the Pareto-dominant equilibrium, the nancial institution does not have
to sell any of its long-term asset holdings and survives. In contrast, in the dominated
equilibrium, the nancial institution is forced to liquidate all long-term asset holdings
and fails. The discussion in this section revolves around the following questions: Can the
dominated equilibrium also emerge in a setting with regular sellers as opposed to short
sellers? If yes, is there reason to believe that it is more likely to emerge as a result of short
selling as opposed to regular selling?
Recall that in the competitive setup developed above, when all trades are executed at
the nal market clearing price, short sellers are indierent between the two equilibria that
are possible in the vulnerability region|they make zero prots in either. More generally, if
short sellers can walk down the demand curve when establishing their short position (i.e.,
when not all trades are executed at the nal price) they strictly prefer the equilibrium in
which they collectively prey on the nancial institution. This contrasts with situation that
would arise if short sellers were regular sellers: While a setup with regular sellers instead
of short sellers would lead to the same two equilibria in the vulnerability region, regular
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sellers strictly prefer the equilibrium in which they hold on to their shares and do not
sell. Hence, with regular sellers, the dominated equilibrium can only emerge as a result of
coordination failure|existing shareholders sell because they expect everyone else to sell,
comparable to the dominated equilibrium in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). While this, of
course, does not rule out the dominated equilibrium, it is a reasonable proposition that
the dominated equilibrium is less likely to emerge through a pure coordination failure of
regular sellers than through a (weakly) protable attack by predatory short sellers.
In addition, as soon as we depart from the competitive benchmark and allow for some
amount of coordination among short sellers or shareholders, the equilibrium regions dif-
fer depending on whether sellers are regular sellers or short sellers. Specically, some
amount of coordination among short sellers increases the doomed region where the unique
equilibrium involves a complete liquidation of the nancial institution. In contrast, some
amount of coordination among regular sellers increases the safety region where the unique
equilibrium involves no liquidation.
Formally, we model the degree of coordination by assuming that there is a large trader
or, equivalently, a mass of small traders who can coordinate their actions. The large
trader (or coordinated traders) internalize that their trading decision moves the share
price. The remaining traders form a competitive fringe and take prices as given. In the
short selling case, we assume that the large short seller can take a maximum short position
of SMAX. In the case of regular sellers, we assume that the large shareholder owns SMAX
shares in the nancial institution, while the competitive fringe owns SMAXC shares. We
also assume that if both the large shareholder and the competitive fringe sell their shares,
the share price drops to zero and the nancial institution has to liquidate all of its long-
term asset holdings. Formally, this assumption requires that in the regular selling case
SMAX + SMAXC = eS, where eS is dened by eP = P   eS = 0. Note that in both the regular
and the short selling case SMAX proxies for the amount of coordination that is possible.
For simplicity and to reect the role of large traders (such as George Soros) as rst
movers, we assume that the large trader moves rst and that the competitive fringe moves
after the large trader's order has been executed. However, as we describe in more detail
below, the ndings in Proposition 3 do not depend on the specic assumptions on move
and execution order. For example, we could alternatively assume that the large trader and
the competitive fringe submit their orders and are executed simultaneously, or that the
execution order is random and traders submit limit orders. Both of these alternative setups
would leave the equilibrium regions described in Proposition 3 unchanged (see footnotes
16 and 17 for more details).
Consider rst the case of short sellers. The large short seller moves rst and chooses
S 2 [0; SMAX]. The large short seller's trade is then executed at P (S) = P   S. Then, the
competitive fringe moves and chooses SC . The orders of the competitive fringe are executed
at P (S + SC) = P   (S + SC). Whenever the maximum short position of the large short
seller, SMAX, is suciently large to make the short sale protable irrespective of the
actions of other short sellers, the unique equilibrium involves predatory short selling. This
is the case whenever SMAX > S, where S denotes the short position required to make a
short sale protable (for a formal denition of S, see equation (A7) in the appendix). This
condition holds when the nancial institution is suciently close to its leverage constraint.
Hence, the presence of a large short seller expands the doomed region in which the unique
equilibrium involves complete liquidation of the nancial institution.
In contrast, in the case of regular sellers the presence of the large trader expands the
safety region in which the unique equilibrium involves no liquidation by the nancial
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institution: This is the case when the blockholder's decision not to sell his shares can
ensure that no coordination failure occurs, which is the case when SMAX > eS   S: Given
that the large shareholder does not sell, the competitive fringe cannot protably coordinate
to sell because eP (SMAXC ) < P (SMAXC ). The unique best response is thus SC = 0 and no
liquidation is the unique equilibrium.14 Solving for SMAX > S and SMAX > eS   S in
terms of the parameters of the model yields the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Assume that there is a large trader or, equivalently, a mass of small
traders that can coordinate there actions up to a maximum of SMAX shares.
1. Short selling: If traders who coordinate up to SMAX are short sellers,











2. Regular selling: If traders who coordinate up to SMAX are regular sellers,













The equilibrium regions in the presence of a large trader are illustrated in Figure 5. The
top panel illustrates the expansion of the doomed region in the presence of a large short
seller. The bottom panel illustrates the expansion of the safety region in the presence of
a large shareholder in the regular selling case.
Proposition 3 shows that once a certain amount of coordination is possible, there is a
sharp dierence between short selling and regular selling: While in both cases coordination
shrinks the parameter vulnerability region (the region with multiple equilibria), in the
short selling case this happens via an expansion of the doomed region (in which predatory
short selling is the unique equilibrium), whereas in the case of regular sellers this happens
through an expansion of the safety region (where no liquidation is the unique equilibrium).
In the extreme, the vulnerability region vanishes completely. In the short selling case, the
nancial institution is then liquidated as soon as short sellers have the ability to force the
nancial institution to violate its leverage constraint (i.e., when R < D0
X
). In the case of
14 The role of the large short seller or blockholder discussed here is similar to the role of
large players in the literature on currency crises. See, in particular, Corsetti, Pesenti, and
Roubini (2002) and Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris, and Shin (2004) for a setting in which
traders face a binary decision on whether or not to attack a currency.
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Fig. 5. Equilibrium regions under short selling and regular selling. The
gure compares equilibrium regions under short selling and regular selling in the
presence of a large trader (or a mass of small traders who can coordinate their
actions) of size SMAX. The parameter region for which the unique equilibrium in-
volves liquidation of the nancial institution is larger under short selling than under
regular selling. Conversely, the parameter region for which the unique equilibrium
involves no liquidation by the nancial institution is larger under regular selling
than under short selling.
regular sellers, on the other hand, no liquidation occurs unless the nancial institution
violates its leverage constraint in the absence of short sellers (i.e., when R < D0
X
).15 16 17
15 One interesting implication of Proposition 3 is that the region in which the unique
equilibrium involves predatory short selling depend on the slope of the demand curve
, which we have taken as given here. This is the case when the position limit for the
short seller are in terms of the maximum number of shares that can be shorted, SMAX.
Alternatively, if position limits are dened as \price impact" limits (which would be of
the form SMAX=), the region in which predatory short selling is the unique equilibrium
is independent of the slope of the demand curve , thereby recovering the irrelevance
property of Lemma 3.
16 If instead of sequential orders and execution we were to assume that orders are sub-
mitted and executed simultaneously, the resulting equilibrium regions would be identical
to those in Proposition 3. The main dierence is that, in the simultaneous-move game,
it is the threat of the large short seller that eliminates the no-liquidation equilibrium. As
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3.4 SUPPORT BUYING BY A LARGE TRADER
Next, we discuss the eect of adding investors who can step in to buy shares (recall that
up to now the long-term investors that form the residual demand curve were assumed to
be completely passive and thus never acted as active support buyers). To do this, consider
the case in which both a large short seller (or a mass of short sellers who can coordinate)
and a large support buyer (or a mass of traders who can coordinate to purchase stock in
the nancial institution) are present. We assume that the support buyer (this could, for
example, be a blockholder or another large trader with a vested interest in the nancial
institution) can buy up to BMAX additional shares to support the nancial institution.
For simplicity, we set the support buyer's initial endowment in shares of the nancial
institution to zero. As before, the large short seller can short a maximum of SMAX shares.
As in the previous subsection, we assume that the large traders (the short seller and the
support buyer) trade rst, followed by the competitive fringe.
In this case, the region in which predatory short selling is the unique equilibrium de-
pends on the relative strength of the support buyer vis-a-vis the short seller. Specically,
starting from a conjectured no-liquidation equilibrium, the short seller's maximum posi-
tion SMAX must now be suciently large to make deviation protable even if the support
buyer purchases the maximum amount of shares BMAX. If this is the case, the unique
equilibrium involves predatory short selling. Similar to Proposition 3, we can then char-
acterize the regions in which the unique equilibrium involves predatory short selling as
follows:
Proposition 4. Assume that there is a large short seller or, equivalently, a mass of
small traders that can coordinate there actions up to a maximum of SMAX shares. Assume
also that there is a large support buyer (or a mass of small support buyers coordinate)
who can purchase BMAX additional shares to support the share price of the nancial in-











before, when SMAX > S, the large short seller has a strictly protable deviation from a
conjectured no-liquidation strategy prole. However, the large short seller cannot be part
of a zero-prot short selling equilibrium with S + SC = eS, because from any such equi-
librium he would have an incentive to slightly reduce the size of his short position and
make positive (instead of zero) prots. Hence, when SMAX > S the unique equilibrium is
a predatory short selling equilibrium in which the competitive fringe takes a short position
of SC = eS in response to the threat of a short potions by the large short seller.
17 Also a setup with random execution order in which traders can submit limit orders
leads to the same equilibrium regions. Because there is a one-to-one mapping between
the execution price and the order of execution, limit orders allow traders to eectively
condition their sell orders on when they are executed. If the large trader is executed rst,
the analysis is identical to the one discussed in the text (the analysis in the text is a
limiting case of the more general limit order setup: the probability that the large trader is
executed rst is one). In the case where the large trader is executed after the competitive
fringe, the equilibrium regions remain the same but in the coordination failure equilibrium
the large shareholder may sell slightly less if he anticipates that his order will be executed
after the competitive fringe (and thereby at a lower price). See the appendix for more
details.
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Relative to Proposition 3, we thus see that the presence of a support buyer shrinks
doomed region, in which full liquidation is the unique equilibrium. This is because the
boundary of the doomed region is now determined by the relative strength of the large
short seller and the support buyer, as captured by SMAX  BMAX. Moreover, under the
interpretation that SMAX and BMAX reect the extent to which multiple blockholders and
multiple short sellers can coordinate, Proposition 4 highlights how, in addition to their
sheer nancial strength, the relative ability of blockholders and short sellers to coordinate
becomes an important element in determining which equilibrium obtains.
4. Discussion
While the simple model presented above does not provide a full welfare analysis of short
selling, our analysis generates a number of predictions that may help in devising a more
dierentiated regulatory approach to short selling. Moreover, the empirical predictions of
our model may be helpful in interpreting existing empirical evidence as well as providing
guidance for the design of future empirical studies on short selling.
4.1 REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
Vulnerability of nancial institutions to short sales. One of the main implications
of our model is to highlight the potential vulnerability of nancial institutions to preda-
tory short selling. In our model, predatory short selling can emerge because of a leverage
constraint that captures the run risk faced by nancial institutions that inherently have
signicant maturity and liquidity mismatch. This run constraint allows short sellers to cap-
italize on nancial weakness by forcing an institution to liquidate long-term investments,
leading to a reduction in fundamental value. This reduction in fundamental value, in turn,
allows short sellers to break even on their positions. Hence, the potential unwillingness
of creditors to renew their funding leads to a fragility in nancial institutions' funding
structures that can potentially be exploited by predatory short sellers. Firms with more
stable capital structures, on the other hand, should be less susceptible to the predatory
behavior characterized in this paper.
Temporary short-sale bans. In terms of regulations that restrict short selling, our
analysis implies that, while banning short selling during normal times is not desirable,
it can make sense to restrict short selling of nancial stocks temporarily when balance
sheets across most nancial institutions are weak: When banks are well-capitalized (and
predatory short selling does not occur in equilibrium), short sellers merely carry out their
benecial role of enforcing the law of one price, providing liquidity and incorporating in-
formation into prices. Our model thus does not provide a justication for a general ban of
short selling on the grounds of predatory behavior. However, when nancial institutions'
balance sheets are weak and they enter the vulnerability region, destabilizing predatory
short selling can occur, leading to inecient liquidation of long-term investments by vul-
nerable institutions. Hence, while we want to stress that our paper does not provide a full
welfare analysis of short selling, this result provides a potential justication for temporary
short sales restrictions to curb predatory behavior (if one believes that the costs of po-
tential predatory short selling outweigh potential overvaluation and reduction in liquidity
during a short selling ban).
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Disclosure of short positions. A major result of our analysis is the role of multiplic-
ity of equilibria in the vulnerability region. Because there are two stable equilibria in this
region, coordination among short sellers is crucial in determining which of the two equilib-
ria we end up in. This has implications for the disclosure of short positions. In particular,
in addition to recent short-sale restrictions, a number of regulators have enacted tougher
disclosure requirements for short positions. In the U.S., the SEC enacted a rule requiring
institutional investors to publicly disclose their short positions on a weekly basis.18. In the
UK, the FSA implemented a rule that requires that investors disclose on each day any
short positions in excess of 0.25% of the ordinary share capital of nancial companies at
the end of trading the previous day.19. Since November 1, 2012, EU regulation requires
short sellers to report to regulators is they intend to short sell more than 0.2% of a com-
pany's tradable shares and to publicly report short positions that exceed 0.5% of tradable
shares.20
However, our analysis indicates that public disclosure of short positions can, in fact, be
counterproductive. In particular, requiring public disclosure of all short positions may in
fact facilitate coordination among predatory short sellers. When short sellers are required
to publicly disclose positions, it may thus be more likely that we end up in the predatory
equilibrium when in the vulnerability region. One way to capture this formally in our model
is to consider an increase in the amount of shares up to which short sellers can coordinate,
SMAX. It follows directly from Proposition 3 that such an increase in coordination enlarges
the doomed region, in which a predatory short selling attack is the unique equilibrium.
This suggests that disclosure should either only be made to the regulator, or should be
made public only with sucient time delay.
Other regulatory interventions. Up to now, we have limited our discussion of po-
tential regulatory interventions to restricting short sales. In this section, we briey discuss
other potential regulatory measures that may reduce the vulnerability of nancial insti-
tutions to predatory behavior by short sellers.
First, the leverage constraint arises because short-term creditors may withdraw funding
from the nancial institution. This implies that interventions to increase the stability of
the nancial institution's nancing may be desirable. For example, such an intervention
could take the form of limiting liquidity mismatch, thus reducing nancial fragility and
increasing the resilience of the nancial institution against short selling attacks. Another
potential regulatory intervention that would help nancial institutions fend o predatory
short selling attacks is a requirement for nancial institutions to hold more equity. Such
a requirement would make it less likely that the nancial institution enters the vulnera-
bility region and thus reduces the nancial fragility that can be exploited by short sellers.
Alternatively (if additional equity capital is costly), a requirement to issue at least some
amount of reverse convertible debt that converts into equity if the leverage constraint
binds would allow the nancial institution to reduce leverage without selling any of its
long-term asset holdings.
Second, in our model a credible promise to recapitalize the nancial institution could
eliminate that \bad" equilibrium: If short sellers anticipate that the nancial institution
18 See SEC release 34-58785, available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/nal/2008/34-
58785.pdf.
19 See \Implementing aspects of the Financial Services Act 2010" available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp1 18.pdf
20 See \Europe's naked short selling ban leaves investors with skin in the game," Reuters,
December 4, 2012.
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never has to liquidate any of its long-term asset holdings, they will never attack, know-
ing that they cannot break even on their short positions. However, such an intervention
eectively amounts to a government guarantee for the nancial sector. In a richer model
where nancial institutions choose their investments, this would lead to substantial moral
hazard concerns. It is thus not clear that such a guarantee would be desirable (at least if
it is anticipated ex ante).
Third, to the extent that regulators use temporary short-sale bans to protect vulnerable
nancial institutions from predatory short selling attacks, this will likely increase the
importance of prompt corrective action by regulators. Specically, if short-sale bans make
it harder for market participants to single out nancial institutions that should be shut
down or restructured (e.g., so-called zombie banks), then the regulator's role in identifying
these institutions becomes all the more important.
Panic sales. While the focus of this paper is on short selling, another novel result of
our analysis is that, in addition to short sales, regulators may also want to consider the
possibility of destabilizing \panic sales" by current investors in the nancial institution's
equity. In particular, if current shareholders fear that other shareholders are likely to sell
their holdings, such panic sales can become self-fullling for nancial institutions that are
subject to leverage constraints of the type described in our model. Hence, akin to the
classic bank run problem described in Diamond and Dybvig (1983), our analysis implies
that regulators may want to have an eye on nancial market runs on the equity of for
nancial institutions that are subject to leverage constraints. As shown in Proposition 3,
this concern is stronger the less likely it is that current shareholder can coordinate their
actions.
4.2 EMPIRICAL PREDICTIONS
Existing empirical evidence. A number of recent papers empirically examine the eects
of recent short selling bans in the U.S. and Europe. For example, Beber and Pagano (2013)
use international data to document the eects of short sale bans across dierent markets.
Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) provide a detailed investigation of the U.S. ban on
short sales imposed by the SEC in September 2008. The main ndings of these (and a
number of other) studies is that short sale bans led to an unambiguous and signicant
reduction in liquidity, market quality, and the speed of price discovery (as measured, for
example, by bid-ask spreads, eective spreads, or price impact measures). However, the
results regarding the eect of short sale bans on prices|perhaps the main motivation
for intervention|are much weaker. For example, Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) nd
signicant abnormal excess returns only for the largest U.S. nancial institutions and point
out that those may have been caused by the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), which
was launched more or less at the same time. In fact, because their analysis suggests that
the price eects were permanent, they conclude that the TARP may have been the more
likely cause.
Cross-sectional predictions from our model. Our analysis may help interpret
some of the ndings of these recent empirical studies. Moreover, the empirical implica-
tions of our analysis could potentially be helpful in the design of future empirical studies
of short selling bans on nancial institutions. First, our model suggests that nancial in-
stitutions, as opposed to other rms, should be particularly aected by short sale bans.
Second, the ability of short sellers to prey on nancial institutions depends crucially on
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the nancial condition of the nancial institution. Hence in assessing the price eects of
short-sale restrictions, one should control for leverage, maturity mismatch, or similar vari-
ables that measure nancial fragility. The cross-sectional prediction of our model is that it
is vulnerable nancial rms for which the price eects of short sale bans are largest. Third,
our model highlights the importance of taking into account the potential multiplicity of
equilibria when interpreting the empirical evidence. For example, if investors expect that,
with some probability, there is a switch to the dominated equilibrium in which the bank
goes bankrupt, the elimination of the bad equilibrium through a short selling ban may
lead to a permanent price eect. This can be the case even if the ban itself is temporary:
Investors now anticipate that regulators may impose another ban should nancial insti-
tutions re-enter the vulnerability region. Hence, according to our analysis the permanent
price increase documented by Boehmer, Jones, and Zhang (2013) could also be attributed
to a short-sale ban that eliminates the likelihood of the dominated equilibrium.
The funding of blockholders. In addition to the cross-sectional predictions above, a
novel prediction of our model is that the vulnerability of a nancial institution to predatory
short selling depends not only on its own balance sheet but also on the balance sheets (or
funding conditions) of its large shareholders and other potential support buyers. Specif-
ically, if large shareholders or other support buyers are important in fending o short
selling attacks, their ability to do so depends on their own funding liquidity, as proxied
by the parameter BMAX in Proposition 4. Hence, our model makes the prediction that,
in the cross-section, nancial institutions with less well-capitalized blockholders, are more
vulnerable to predatory short selling attacks. Moreover, in the time series, predatory short
selling attacks are more likely to be successful when funding conditions for blockholders
are tight on average, for example during nancial crises. Finally, our model predicts that
the vulnerability of nancial institutions to predatory short selling depends on the ability
of blockholders (and short sellers) to coordinate. Empirically, the number of blockholders
may provide a proxy for their ability to coordinate.
Predictions on price skewness. In addition to cross-sectional predictions spelled
out above, our model also predicts that large downward price movements can occur when
a nancial institution enters the vulnerability region or the doomed region. This means
that, in our model, short selling increases negative skewness in equity prices, which is
opposite to the prediction in Hong and Stein (2003), where banning short selling leads to
negative skewness. Consistent with our prediction, Bris, Goetzmann, and Zhu (2007) nd
evidence that there is signicantly less negative skewness in markets in which short selling
is either not legal or not practiced. In addition, our model makes the testable prediction
that, absent short-sale restrictions, negative skewness should be observed particularly for
nancial institutions with weak balance sheets (i.e., those that approach the vulnerability
region or doomed region).
5. Conclusion
This paper provides a simple model of predatory short selling. Predatory short selling
occurs when short sellers exploit nancial weakness or liquidity problems of a nancial
institution. In our model, predatory short sales occur in equilibrium because the drop
in equity valuation caused by short sellers leads non-insured depositors and short-term
creditors to withdraw funding from the nancial institution. Because of this eective
leverage constraint, short sales can force the nancial institution to liquidate long-term
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asset holdings at a discount. The resulting value reduction can allow short sellers to break
even on their positions.
Our analysis shows that nancial institutions can be vulnerable to attacks from preda-
tory short sellers when their balance sheets are weak. For nancial institutions that are
suciently close to their leverage constraints. In the vulnerability region there are two
stable equilibria. One of these stable equilibria does not involve short selling, while in
the other predatory equilibrium short sellers force a complete liquidation of the nancial
institution's long-term asset holdings. In the doomed region there is a unique predatory
equilibrium in which the nancial institution liquidates its entire long-term asset holdings.
The doomed region is larger, the better potential short sellers are able to coordinate their
actions.
While our model does not develop a full welfare analysis of bans on short selling, the
possibility of predatory short selling in the vulnerability region and the doomed region
provides a potential justication for temporary short sale restrictions for nancial institu-
tions in those regions, although the benets of such restrictions have to be weighed against
the cost of preventing short sellers from performing their benecial role of eliminating po-
tential overvaluation.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Absent the leverage constraint, the fundamental value of the nancial
institution's equity is given by XR D0, irrespective of the short sellers' actions. This
follows immediately from the fact that, in this case, the nancial institution never has
to liquidate early. Given the xed fundamental value XR D0, competition among short
sellers ensures that the share price is equal to the fundamental value XR D0. To see this,
consider rst the case in which the intercept chosen by long-term investors is larger than
the fundamental value of equity, i.e., P > XR D0. In this case, short sellers take a short
position S > 0 and, because short sellers make zero prots in equilibrium, the equilibrium
short position S is such that the share price is equal to fundamental, i.e., eP = XR D0.
Now consider the case in which the intercept chosen by the long-term investors is below
fundamental value. Analogously to before, short sellers now take a long position (they
act, more generally, as arbitrageurs) to ensure that the equity if fairly priced. Finally,
when the intercept chosen by the is equal to fundamental value, i.e., P = XR D0, short
sellers do not take a position in equilibrium, i.e., S = 0. Because in all of these cases the
fundamental value of equity is xed at XR D0, predatory short selling cannot occur. In
all three cases, the equilibrium condition (3) can thus be rewritten as P   S = XR D0:
Proof of Lemma 2: In the case that the constraint is violated, the result follows di-
rectly from solving (7) for X(S). Combining this with the fact that no liquidation occurs
when the constraint is satised and that the maximum amount that can be liquidated is
X, yields the result.
Proof of Lemma 3: The result comes from the fact that, in equilibrium, a change in
either P or  will be exactly oset by a corresponding change in the equilibrium level of
the short position S, such that the equilibrium condition eP = P is satised. Equilibrium
prices and the equilibrium amount that has to be liquidated by the nancial institution
thus remain unaected.
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Proof of Proposition 1:We rst analyze the case  < , which is the case highlighted
in the proposition. For completeness, we then also briey discuss the cases  >  and  = ,
which are not discussed in the main text.
Intuitively, when  < , the P -curve is steeper than the eP -curve, as depicted in the
bottom panel of Figure 1. We now consider the three regions in the proposition in turn.
First, we compute the region in which no predatory short selling can occur (the safety
region). Short sellers cannot break even on a predatory short position if, after forcing
the nancial institution to liquidate its entire long-term asset holdings, the fundamental
equity value at t = 2 still exceeds the stock price that forces this maximum liquidation at
t = 1. In this case, no matter how aggressive their selling, short sellers have to buy back
at a higher price than they receive when shorting the stock at date t = 1.
To calculate the parameter region for which this is the case, assume that short sellers
choose a short position S such that the entire portfolio of the nancial institution is
liquidated, i.e., X(S) = X. This requires that
(1  )D0   (P   S)









This strategy cannot be protable when the stock price that forces the nancial institution
to unwind all of its long-term asset holdings is smaller than the fundamental value of equity
after such a liquidation, i.e.,
XR D0   S < XR D0: (A3)





which is the expression dening the safety region in the proposition. When (A4) is satis-
ed, the nancial institution is well capitalized, and the unique equilibrium is one without
predatory short selling and P = eP = XR D0. Intuitively, in the safety region the liqui-
dation value of the nancial institution's long-term assets is higher than the face value of
outstanding debt.
Second, consider the region in which D0
X
 R  D0
X
(vulnerability region). In this region,
the leverage constraint is not violated in the absence of predatory short selling, since D0
XR

. This means that there is still an equilibrium in which no predatory short selling occurs
and P = eP = XR D0. However, now there is also an equilibrium in which short sellers
force the nancial institution to liquidate its entire asset holdings. In this equilibrium, by
the zero prot condition, we haveeP = XR D0   S = max [XR D0; 0] = P; (A5)
where S  S. Since we know that in this region XR D0  0, the equilibrium price must
be P = 0. In words, the nancial institution has to liquidate all of its long-term assets,
which are not sucient to repay debt, and the equity value is zero. Both of these two
equilibria are stable. Finally, there is a third, unstable equilibrium, in which only part of
the nancial institution's long-term asset holdings are unwound. Denote the amount of
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short selling in the unstable equilibrium by S. In this equilibrium, X(S) < X, such
that we must have
P   S = XR D0   (1  )RX(S): (A6)




  (1  )(D0   XR)
(   ) : (A7)
Using this expression for S, we can determine the price in the unstable equilibrium as
P = P   S = 1  
    (D0   XR): (A8)
Substituting into (A2) yields that the amount the nancial institution has to liquidate in
the unstable equilibrium is X(S) = X
  D0
XR
  , as stated in the proposition.
Third, consider the region in which the leverage constraint is violated even in the
absence of predatory short selling, D0
XR
> . In this region, long-term investors set the
intercept P equal to the fundamental equity value in the absence of short selling: P =
AR D0   (1  )RX(0), where X(0) satises
D0   RX(0)
XR  (1  )RX(0) = ; (A9)








 (1 ) < X, partial liquidation is





simplies to P = XR D0   1  (1 ) [D0   XR], which is the expression in the propo-
sition. In the presence of competitive short sellers, this is an unstable equilibrium: A
perturbation that leads to a small decline in the nancial institution's stock price triggers
selling by short sellers and drives the stock price to zero, forcing a complete liquidation
of the nancial institution's long-term asset holdings. This full liquidation outcome is the
unique stable equilibrium: Short sellers force the nancial institution to sell its entire asset
holdings, X = X. Because XR D0  0, the equilibrium price must be P = 0. This is
the doomed region.
To complete the proof, note that in the doomed region, short sellers (or, more generally,
arbitrageurs) cannot protably act as support buyers by pushing the stock price up such
that the nancial institution does not have to liquidate assets. Because at price eP = XR 
D0, the leverage constraint is violated, preventing liquidation by buying the stock requires
driving up the price to a level that strictly exceeds the fundamental value XR D0. Since
absent liquidation the value of equity is exactly XR D0, this cannot be an equilibrium.
Now we briey consider the case  > . Intuitively, when  > , the P -curve is less steep
than the eP -curve, as depicted in the left panel of Figure 1. The rst thing to note is that




. In this case, as long as R > D0
X
,
the nancial institution is well capitalized and no predatory short selling occurs. As a
result, liquidation only takes place when R < D0
X
. When R < D0
X
, the nancial institution




 (1 ) , if it can satisfy the leverage constraint through
a partial liquidation (i.e., X(0) < X). If X(0)  X, the nancial institution has to
liquidate its entire asset holdings. Because the P -curve is less steep than the eP -curve, short
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sellers cannot force a full liquidation if the nancial institution can satisfy the constraint
through a partial liquidation.
Finally, consider the knife-edge case when  = . In this case, the P and eP curves have
the same slope. This means that when R > D0
X
predatory short selling cannot occur, while
when R < D0
X
, the nancial institution is forced to liquidate all its holdings and P = 0.
When R = D0
X
, the equilibrium price can lie on any point on the interval [0;XR D0].
Proof of Proposition 2: We again focus on the more interesting case  < , which is
the one depicted in Figure 4. The stable equilibria in the presence of short selling follow
directly from Proposition 1. The equilibrium prices when short selling is restricted are
determined as follows. As before, assume that the long-term investors are rational, such
that they correctly anticipate the t = 2 payo P = XR D0   (1  )RX(0). As long as
the leverage constraint is not violated, D
XR
< , the nancial institution does not have to
liquidate (X(0) = 0) and P = XR D0. When DXR > , the nancial institution has to









 (1 ) < X, partial liquidation is possible and the equilibrium price is given by P =




 (1 ) , which simplies to P = XR D0   1  (1 ) [D0   XR].




 (1 )  X, then the nancial institution is forced to liquidate all its
long-term asset holdings at t = 1 and P = 0 even in the absence of short sellers. Solving
the above expression for R shows that full liquidation is required whenever R  D0
X(1+)
.
Proof of Proposition 3: We consider the large short seller rst. Recall that the large
short seller moves rst and chooses S 2 [0; SMAX]. The large short seller's trade is then
executed at P (S) = P   S. Then, the competitive fringe moves and chooses SC . The
orders of the competitive fringe are executed at P (S + SC) = P   (S + SC).
Conjecture a no-liquidation equilibrium. If SMAX < S, the large short seller does not
have a protable deviation: For all S 2 [0; SMAX] we have eP (S) < P , such that a short
sale is unprotable for the large short seller. Hence, the short seller chooses S = 0 and
the no liquidation equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium: SC = 0 is a best response for the
competitive fringe.
Now assume that SMAX > S. Now the short sale is strictly protable for the large
short seller, since for any S 2 (S; SMAX] we have eP (S) > P (S). Hence, the large short
seller chooses S > S. This makes it optimal for the competitive fringe to choose SC =eS   S (such that the zero prot condition holds for the competitive fringe). Hence, when
SMAX > S predatory short selling becomes the unique equilibrium. Inserting (A7) for S
















. The region with a unique predatory short selling equilibrium









Now consider the case of regular sellers. Recall that the large shareholder and the
competitive fringe hold SMAX and SMAXC shares, respectively, and that S
MAX + SMAXC = eS.
The large shareholder moves rst and chooses S 2 [0; SMAX]. This trade is executed at
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P (S) = P   S. Then the competitive fringe chooses SC 2 [0; SMAXC ]. The orders of the
competitive fringe are executed at P (S + SC) = P   (S + SC).
First consider SMAX < eS   S. In this case, irrespective of the large shareholder's de-
cision to sell, the competitive fringe can still cause a coordination failure by selling
SMAXC > S
 shares (in such a coordination failure equilibrium they will always sell the
maximum amount). Anticipating this, the large shareholder will sell some or all of his
shares at price eP = P   S: S = argmaxS P   S+ (SMAX   S)P (SMAXC + S)
However, when SMAX > eS   S, the large shareholder's decision not to sell rules out
the coordination failure equilibrium. Given that the large shareholder does not sell, the
competitive fringe cannot protably coordinate to sell because eP (SMAXC ) < P (SMAXC ). The
unique best response is thus SC = 0 and no liquidation is the unique equilibrium. Using












Inserting P = XR D0 and simplifying yields
SMAX >
(1  )(D0   XR)
(   ) : (A12)











. The region where no liquidation is the unique equilibrium









The analysis is similar in the case with random execution and limit orders. The main
insight is that limit orders eectively allow traders to condition on whether they are
executed rst or second. Hence, we can analyze these two cases in turn. When the large
trader moves rst, the equilibrium is exactly as just discussed. This leaves us to describe
the equilibrium when the competitive fringe moves rst. Consider the short selling case
rst. The competitive fringe makes zero prot in equilibrium, such that both SC = 0 and
SC = eS are possible in equilibrium. If the competitive fringe chooses SC = 0, then the
large short seller picks S = argmaxS[P   S] if SMAX > S and S = 0 otherwise. If the
competitive fringe picks SC = eS, the large short seller chooses S = 0.
Now consider the case of regular sellers when the competitive fringe moves rst. If
SMAX > eS   S (or equivalently SMAXC < S), then no matter what the fringe does, it
is optimal for the large trader to set S = 0. But then the competitive fringe optimally
responds by setting SC = 0 given that any SC 2 (0; SMAXC ] leads to strictly negative prots.
Hence, the unique equilibrium is the no-liquidation equilibrium.
If SMAX > eS   S, then there are multiple equilibria. In the \good" equilibrium, the
competitive fringe chooses SC = 0 and the large trader optimally responds by setting




large shareholder optimally responds with S = argmaxS[P   (SMAXC + S)] + (SMAX  
S)P (S + SMAXC ) > 0. The optimal amount sold by the large shareholder is strictly less
than SMAX, since this would lead to a zero payo.
Taken together, the setup with random execution and limit orders thus leads to exactly
the same equilibrium regions as the setup in which the large trader moves rst. The one
dierence is that in the coordination failure equilibrium in which the large shareholder
PREDATORY SHORT SELLING 31
moves second he may sell less aggressively, internalizing that he will be executed at a
relatively lower price.
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof follows along similar lines to the proof of Propo-
sition 3. We assume that the large short seller and support buyer simultaneously sub-









. The orders of
the large short seller and support buyer are executed at eP (S  B) = P   (S  B). Af-
ter the large traders have moved, the competitive fringe chooses SC and is executed ateP (S  B + SC) = P   (S  B + SC).
First, assume that SMAX > BMAX. The predatory short selling equilibrium is the unique
equilibrium when, starting from a conjectured no-liquidation equilibrium, the short seller
can eect a protable short sale, irrespective of the action of the support buyer. When
SMAX  BMAX < S, the support buyer's best response to any short position S 2 [0; SMAX]
is to lean against the short seller, making the short sale unprotable. Hence, no liquidation
remains an equilibrium. When SMAX  BMAX > S, on the other hand, any S > S +
BMAX is a protable deviation for the large short seller. In this case, no liquidation cannot
be an equilibrium. In the unique liquidation equilibrium, the support buyer optimally
chooses B = 0 (for any B > 0 he would lose money) and, by the zero prot condition, the
competitive fringe chooses SC = eS   S.
Now consider the case SMAX  BMAX. In this case, the support buyer can always
protably counter short sales by the large short seller, such that the upper boundary of
the region in which the unique equilibrium involves short selling and liquidation is given by
R < D0
X
. Taken together, the two cases imply that the region with a unique short selling
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